In a distributed storage system, regenerating codes can be utilized to ensure data availability. This reduces the repair bandwidth but increases the risk of data eavesdropping on each node. Previous studies in this area generally only provided an approximate analysis of the security of schemes with informationtheoretic security or weak security. Some researchers have further divided weak security into block security; however, they only analyzed several the regenerating codes schemes and proposed improved schemes with specific eavesdropping capabilities. In this study, we analyze the block security of a Cauchy-matrix-based product-matrix minimum storage regenerating(MSR) scheme and determine the optimal block security of MSR codes. Lastly, an improved MSR codes scheme for achieving optimal block security is proposed, and the relevant proof is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a distributed system, the regenerating codes scheme [1] , [2] has a low repair communication bandwidth; however, it relies on communication with multiple nodes for data repair and reconstruction. Moreover, eavesdropping attacks on nodes and communication lines routinely occur; therefore, in a distributed system, it is important for the regenerating codes scheme to have lower computational and I/O overhead and anti-eavesdropping capability.
Recently, a number of studies have been conducted on reducing the complexity of regenerating codes. Goparaju et al. proposed a scheme of systematic repair minimum storage regenerating(MSR) codes with no restrictions on parameters n, k, d [3] . Hou et al. [4] proposed a low-complexity regenerating codes scheme that employs binary addition and a bit wise cyclic shift as the elemental operations.
For optimizing read I/O, Rashmi et al. [5] proposed a new class of regenerating codes called repair-by-transfer (RBT) codes that compute and store help data in the encoding phase. During a repair operation, the data collector reads and The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jin Sha. transfers only help data that can reduce the I/O overhead. A generalization of cooperative regenerating codes is presented in [6] ; these codes achieved all parameters of the minimum-bandwidth point. Moreover, the optimal crossrack repair bandwidth for data centers has been discussed in [7] and [8] .
In a distributed environment, security schemes based on cryptography face the problem of key management. Moreover, there are disadvantages such as high computational and communication overhead. Using the concept of secret sharing [9] , Yamamoto and Hirosuke [10] proposed a thresholdbased storage system. Attackers can retrieve original data only if they obtain node data that are higher than a threshold value, i.e., when the eavesdropping capability is lower than the threshold value, attackers cannot obtain any original information. However, the storage utilization rate is low and the repair bandwidth is high.
More studies have achieved information-theoretic security by introducing random numbers. Pawar et al. developed a security boundary of regenerating codes when an eavesdropper can obtain node data and proposed a secure regenerating code that reaches the security boundary [11] . Shah et al. [12] extended the eavesdropper model and proposed a secure regenerating code that reaches the boundary when an eavesdropper can obtain data from more than one node. This scheme meets the security requirement by inserting random data; however, the storage utilization rate rapidly decreases. The storage utilization is least when the capability is close to the threshold, i.e., k. Li et al. [13] proposed a scheme that combines a stream cipher with an erasure code. This scheme ensures an invariant storage rate but increases the computational overhead. Moreover, a number of regenerating codes schemes have been proposed on perfect security such as those in [14] and [15] .
The above mentioned schemes focus on preventing an eavesdropper from obtaining any information about original data from acquired data, which is called information-theoretic security or perfect security, however, such security requirements are very strict for practical applications. Bhattad and Narayanan [16] proposed the concept of weak security, which guarantees that eavesdroppers cannot recover any meaningful information from acquired data, e.g., even if eavesdroppers obtain a+b, they remain unable to obtain specific information about a and b.
Oliveira et al. [17] proposed a scheme for encoding and storing the data in a decentralized manner using the Vandermonde matrix. This scheme enabled the system to reach a weak security standard; however, it did not consider eavesdropping of communication lines, and also had a high repair bandwidth. Regarding weak security, a series of schemes for weakly secure regenerating codes have been proposed. The scheme proposed by Jian et al. [18] used a combination of all-or-nothing transforms and regenerating codes to achieve a weak security standard. However, the above mentioned studies only approximately evaluate the security of the schemes. Rashmi et al. [19] divided weak security into block security according to certain criteria and analyzed the block security of a regular graph and product-matrix minimum bandwidth regenerating (PM-MBR) scheme [20] . However, this literature did not analyze the MSR codes scheme. Kadhe and Sprintson [21] proposed a weakly secure MSR code; however, the scheme is intended only for specific eavesdropping capabilities.
As mentioned above, based on classical system regenerating codes, the existing studies on secure regenerating codes propose perfect or weakly secure coding schemes. However, they ignore the weak security of non-systematic regenerating codes and do not analyze the strength of weak security. Although several studies proposed a weak security strength analysis method called block security [20] , some classical regenerating codes, such as PM-MSR codes, were not analyzed. Moreover, the analysis method used in [20] relies on the specific structure of the generator matrix of PM-MBR codes, which cannot be applied to PM-MSR codes, and is more complex. In terms of optimizing weak security, there is no optimizing of a weakly secure scheme for arbitrary parameters, and optimal weakly secure regenerating codes have not been developed.
Compared with existing secure regenerating codes schemes, we provide two main contributions in this study: 1) We present a simple method for analyzing the weak security of the MSR scheme based on the rank of the generating matrix. We then use this method to analyze the weak security of Cauchy-based PM-MSR codes with different eavesdropping capabilities.
2) We analyze and determine the optimal weak security of MSR codes, and then propose a weakly secure MSR codes scheme based on PM-MSR codes that achieves optimal weak security with arbitrary eavesdropping capability.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section II, we present preliminaries, while in Section III we provide an analysis of the block security of the PM-MSR codes scheme and the optimal block security of MSR codes. In Section IV, we propose a new MSR codes scheme that achieves optimal weak security, and in section V, we present our conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. REGENERATING CODES MODEL
We consider a distributed storage system (DSS) that contains n nodes. The data stored in the DSS can be viewed as comprising symbols, where each symbol represents an independent random variable over a finite field F q .
Assume that a file comprising B symbols can be represented as a row vector F = f 1 f 2 · · · f B , where f i represents a symbol, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B}. The DSS encodes the file with an (n, k, d, α, β) MSR code [1] , and the encoded data contain nα symbols stored in n nodes. Each node stores α symbols, and set C i ∈ F 1×α q represents the symbols stored in node i, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The calculation of C i can be expressed as follows:
where G i ∈ F α×B q is the generator matrix of the data stored in node i.
When reconstructing the entire file, the data collector must connect any k nodes and download kα symbols to decode the original data. When repairing the data of a single node, the date collector must connect any d available nodes and download γ = dβ symbols to repair. With MSR codes, the relationship between these parameters is as follows:
.
In this study, we only consider the case of β = 1, because any regenerating codes with β > 1 can be constructed using a regenerating codes scheme with β = 1. In regenerating codes scheme with β > 1, the data stored in each node can be regarded as β groups. The data of each group can be generated independently by regenerating codes with β = 1. In the repair operation, the β symbols help data can be calculated from β groups separately. In data reconstruction, data of each group is also reconstructed separately.
B. EAVESDROPPER MODE
We assume that there is an eavesdropper named Eva whose eavesdropping capability can be expressed as l [12] . This indicates that Eva can obtain the data stored in any l nodes. Eva has limited eavesdropping capability, l < k, and completely understands the storage and coding methods used by DSS. However, Eva can only passively obtain data, and cannot tamper with the data or actively initiate false data.
In this study, Eva can obtain lα symbols from any l nodes. Let E = {E 1 , E 2 , · · · , E l } be the set of these l nodes. Setting the data obtained by the eavesdropper to
C. SECURITY SETTINGS Information-theoretic perfect security requires that even if Eva obtains some data, she still cannot obtain any information about the original file. Definition 1: An (n, k) coding scheme is said to have perfect security against an eavesdropper with parameter
In other words, the storage system must combine data with random symbols to achieve perfect security; however, this reduces the storage utilization rate. The scheme presented in [12] constructs a perfectly secure regenerating code based on PM-MSR codes, and the additional storage space demanded by the perfect security requirement is lα. For mass data storage systems in particular, the storage overhead is considerable. Thus, perfect security wastes storage space in the system and may not be affordable.
Because perfect security is too strict for an actual DSS, a weaker security model with a lower costs is often more suitable. In this study, we focus on weak security, which means that Eva cannot obtain any information about single file symbols.
Definition 2: If ∀C E and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B}, I (f i ; C E ) = 0, then the (n, k) coding scheme is called weak security against an eavesdropper with parameter l(l < k).
Perfect and weak security are two extreme cases. When Eva cannot obtain any information about any group of b symbols of F, this is called a b-block security case.
Definition 3: Let F b be a vector comprising b symbols in F. An (n, k) coding scheme is called b-block security against an eavesdropper with parameter l(l
Therefore, weak security analysis can be considered as the process of computing the mutual information between C E and any group of F b . Reference [22] provides the relationship between mutual information and the rank of the code generation matrix.
Lemma 1: Consider an MSR scheme with generator matrix G ∈ F nα×B q . Let G E be a lα × B submatrix of G. The data obtained by Eva can be represented as (3) .
Then, for any G E and θ b , we have
D. REVIEW OF PM-MSR CODES
Shah et al. [12] proposed a realizable PM-MSR codes scheme. Here, we only consider the case of d = 2k − 2, because any scheme with parameter d > 2k − 2 can be constructed through this scheme. In this case, according to equation (2), we have k = α + 1, B = kα = α(α + 1), and d = 2α.
In the PM-MSR codes scheme, B = kα original symbols are placed in a d ×α matrix M ∈ F d×α q when encoding, which is composed of α × α symmetric matrices M 1 and M 2 . The data stored in node i is then calculated by
where i denotes row i of the generator matrix . Note that the matrix is composed of and · , = · , where is the Vandermonde or the Cauchy matrix, and is a diagonal matrix with different elements.
III. WEAK SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. CODING SCHEME CONVERSION
To utilize Lemma 1 for weak security analysis, it is necessary to convert the expression of the coding process of PM-MSR code from (5) to (1) . We assume that the symbols of the
be the ith row and jth column element of . Then, an element of G i can be represented as follows:
Consider a PM-MSR code scheme with parameters n = 7, k = 4, d = 6, α = 3, and β = 1. We then have B = 12 and
According to (6) , in the case of α = 3, the generation matrix G 3 1 of the data stored in node 1 can be expressed as (8) , shown at the bottom of the next page. The top left half of G 3 1 can be considered the generation matrix when α = 2, denoted G 2 1 . Let 3 1 be the first row of the matrix 3 . We then have the following: 3 Then, (8) can be converted into the following:
Therefore, the generator matrix of each node in the PM-MSR code scheme is an iterative structure. The generator matrix of node i, denoted G α i , can be represented as follows:
where α i is the ith row of the matrix α and α i represents the submatrix of residual elements.
Similarly, the expression of the calculation of C E must be converted into (3) . When l = 1, Eva can obtain the data of any single node, which can be calculated by (1) in which G E is generated by (6) .
In the case of l > 1, G E has the same structure as G i . Considering the above mentioned coding example, we have (12) , as shown at the bottom of this page, where
It is known that G 3 E is a recursive structure, which can be expressed as follows:
Therefore, G α E can be expressed as follows:
B. WEAK SECURITY OF CAUCHY-BASED PM-MSR CODES
In this section, we focus on the analysis of the weak security of the PM-MSR codes scheme based on Cauchy matrix. Becasue the elements in a Cauchy matrix are unequal to each other and their arbitrary submatrices are full rank, a scheme based on Cauchy matrix has improved weak security. The primary results are presented in this section. Theorem 1: If the encoding matrix is a Cauchy matrix, then the PM-MSR codes scheme is (2α − l)-block secure against an eavesdropper with parameter l(l < k).
Proof: Definition 3 demonstrates that if the scheme is (2α − l)-block secure, Eva cannot obtain information related to any group with less than or equal to 2α − l symbols, and the problem is equivalent to the following: if and only if b ≤ 2α − l, then any F b makes I (F b ; C E ) = 0. According to Lemma 1, the proof of this theorem is equivalent to proving that if and only if b ≤ 2α − l, then any F b makes
According to (15) ,
where
are submatrices of θ b . In the same manner, we have
In this recursive representation, θ b can be expressed as follows:
We then have
For the convenience of proof, an elementary transformation
such that the rank of the submatrix satisfies the following condition:
Before proving the theorem, we proved the following two lemmas.
Below, we prove the theorem in terms of sufficiency and necessity. 
According to (17) and Lemma3, we have
When l = α − 1, any submatrices generated by removing any α − 1 columns of matrix G α−1 E are still full rank.
Any l × l submatrices of α E are full rank, and if rank
c: GENERAL CASES
The proof for the l = α − 1 case can be extended to general cases. According to Lemma 2, if l ≤ w ≤ α, we have rank G w E w+1 = rank G w E . Then, (26) and (27) can be converted into the following general cases:
Any submatrices generated by removing any l column of G l E ARE still full rank; thus, if rankθ l b ≤ l, then
Any l × l submatrices of w E are full rank.
The sufficiency proof of the theorem is thus complete. E + rank θ b . The necessity proof of the theorem is thus complete. Therefore, if and only if b ≤ 2α − l, then any F b results in rank G E θ b = rank G E + rank θ b , and the Cauchy matrixbased PM-MSR codes scheme is (2α−l)-block secure against an eavesdropper with parameter l(l < k).
C. OPTIMAL BLOCK SECURITY
Although the Cauchy-matrix-based PM-MSR codes scheme is (2α − l)-block secure, it is not an optimal scheme. In this section, we present the optimal weak security achieved by the MSR scheme. Theorem 2: The optimal weakly secure MSR scheme with parameter (n, k, d, α, β) can only achieve (B − lα)-block security, where B = kα, β = 1.
Proof: The generator matrix G E and matrix θ b are both full-row-rank matrices and rank G E = lα. According to the nature of the matrix rank,
1. If rank θ b > B − lα, we have
Therefore, when rank θ b > B − lα there is no θ b to lead to I (F b ; C E ) = 0. 2. In the case of rank θ b = B − lα, we have
When rank θ b = B − lα, there is a θ b that results in I (F b ; C E ) = 0. Therefore, the optimal weak security of the MSR codes scheme is (B − lα)-block security. There is thus room for improvement in the weak security performance of the PM-MSR codes scheme.
IV. OPTIMAL WEAKLY SECURE MSR CODES SCHEME
In this section, we propose an improved scheme based on PM-MSR codes to optimize weak security, called optimal weakly secure PM-MSR (OWSPM-MSR) codes.
A. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
The encoding process shown in Figure 1 has data preprocessing that is encoded by non-systematic RS code based on a Cauchy matrix. The proposed scheme pre-codes the data, and then encodes it with the PM-MSR codes scheme. The generator matrix of the two encoding schemes must have certain properties to ensure that the scheme has optimal weak security. The scheme is divided into two processes: data preprocessing and data encoding.
1) DATA PREPROCESSING a: GENERATION OF ENCODING MATRIX
Set the coding parameters (n, k, α, β, d) according to the node conditions, and randomly generate two groups of parameter sets {x i ∈ F q |i = 1, · · · , B}, {y i ∈ F q |i = 1, · · · , B}, in which any two elements in each group are different. Then, generate a Cauchy matrix as follows:
which is the generation matrix for data preprocess.
b: PRECODING PROCESS
Let the encoding data be F = [f 1 f 2 . . . f B ], and set f i as a single symbol, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , B}. The precoding process can then be expressed as follows:
The data F generated by the preprocessing is encoded using a PM-MSR scheme. First, the parameter sets {x i ∈ F q |i = 1, · · · , α}, {y i ∈ F q |i = 1, · · · , α} and {λ i ∈ F q |i = 1, 2, · · · , α} are randomly generated, in which any two elements in each set are different. Moreover, the following three parameters are satisfied λ i · x i = x i , λ i · y i = y i , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , α}. Then, we can generate a α × α Cauchy matrix and a diagonal matrix as follows:
Thus, the PM-MSR encoding matrix is generated by = ˜ ˜ , which can be considered a d × α Cauchy matrix. The encoding process is described in Section II. The data stored in each node after encoding can be expressed as follows:
where G i is generated by (6) .
B. ANALYSIS OF WEAK SECURITY
In this section, we evaluate the weak security of the OWSPM-MSR codes scheme. According to (3) and (43), the actual data obtained by Eva in this scheme can be expressed as follows:
The main result is presented later in this section. Theorem 3: The OWSPM-MSR codes scheme has optimal weak security; i.e., the scheme achieves (B − lα)-block security.
Proof: According to (4), the assessment of the block security of a scheme is transformed from computing mutual information into the rank of the generator matrix. Under the OWSPM-MSR codes scheme, (4) is converted into the follows:
Thus, the proof of the theorem involves proving that if and only if b ≤ B − lα, then any F b can result in
The coding scheme demonstrates that θ b ∈ F b×B q and G E ∈ F lα×B q is a full-row-rank matrix, and¯ ∈ F B×B q is a full-rank matrix. According to the matrix rank property, G E ·¯ remains a full-row-rank matrix. Therefore, if and only if the rank of G E ·¯ θ b is (lα + b), then (46) is true.
1) NECESSITY PROOF
This proof is equivalent to proving that if b > B−lα, then (46) is false. When b > B − lα, then lα + b > B. According to the nature of the matrix,
Therefore, if b > B − lα, the rows in this matrix must be linearly correlated, and (46) is false. The necessity proof of the theorem is thus complete.
2) SUFFICIENCY PROOF
The elementary transformation does not change the rank of the matrix; therefore,
where G E ·¯ is a lα × (B − b) submatrix of G E ·¯ , and is a submatrix comprising (B − b) columns of¯ . Therefore, the sufficiency proof is equivalent to proving that if b ≤ B − lα, then any¯ can result in rank (G E ·¯ ) = lα.
For b = B − lα, G E ·¯ is a lα × lα square matrix. According to the above analysis of the structure of matrix G E , we have
where E is a l × 2α matrix as expressed in (15) , and¯ i is 2α × lα submatrix of¯ . To facilitate description, sets X and Y are defined as follows:
Because G E ·¯ is a square matrix, we can assess whether it is full rank using the Cauchy-Binet formula [23] :
where S is a subset of any lα elements in the set {1, 2, 3, · · · , 2α 2 }, set X S is a submatrix composed of S-labeled columns in matrix X , and Y S is a submatrix composed of S-labeled rows in matrix Y .
i. When l = 1, E is a 1 × 2α matrix. In all possible forms of X S , except for the case in which the determinant is zero, the other forms are diagonal matrices, and det(X S ) ≥ 0. For all possible forms of Y S , except for the case in which the determinant is zero, the other forms are α × α Cauchy matrices, and det(Y S ) ≥ 0. There must be a case in which det(X S ) and det(Y S ) are not zero at the same time; thus, when l = 1, det(G E ·¯ ) > 0, G E ·¯ is a full-rank matrix.
ii. When l = 2, E is a 2 × 2α matrix. In all possible forms of X S , except for the case in which the determinant is zero, the other matrices are block diagonal matrices
where E,i is a 2 × 2 submatrix of E , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , α}. E,i is also a Cauchy matrix; therfore, E,i > 0, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , α}. The determinant of this type of X S is taken as a value:
then det(X S ) ≥ 0. For all possible forms of Y S , except for the case in which the determinant is zero, the other matrices are 2α × 2α Cauchy matrices; thus, det(Y S ) ≥ 0. There must be a case in which det(X S ) and det(Y S ) are not zero at the same time. Thus, when l = 2, det(G E ·¯ ) > 0, G E ·¯ is a full-rank matrix.
iii. General cases:
The method proven above can be extended to the general case, in which E is a l × 2α matrix. If X S comprises any l +1 columns of E , then det(X S ) = 0. The other forms of X S are block diagonal matrices that can be represented by (52), where E,i is a l × l Cauchy matrix. In the same manner, E,i > 0, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , α}. According to (53), we have det(X S ) ≥ 0. For all possible forms of Y S , except for the case in which the determinant is zero, the other matrices are lα × lα Cauchy matrices, and det(Y S ) ≥ 0. There must be a case in which det(X S ) and det(Y S ) are not zero at the same time. Thus, when 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the OWSPM-MSR codes scheme in terms of computational overhead, storage overhead, and block security by comparing it with A-WSMSRC scheme [18] and PM-MSR codes scheme.
A. EVALUATION SETTING
We implemented the OWSPM-MSR codes in C based on the public implementation Jerasure and performed the evaluation on a PC with Intel Core(TM) i5-4210 CPU, 1.7 GHz, 4GB RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04. We selected a finite field size of 2 8 and block size of 1024.
B. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
We used different schemes to encode and decode files under different parameters k and m, which represent file size. Moreover, we recorded their encoding and decoding time to compare the computational overhead. For comparison accuracy, each data point in the Figures 2-3 is the average of 10 runs.
As shown in Figure 2 (a), we used different schemes to encode a 1Mb file with k ranging from 4 to 10. Because the A-WSMSRC and OWSPM-MSR scheme add a precoding process, which leads to increased computational overhead. A (B, B) RS scheme is adopted in the precoding process; thus, the change in encoding time is related to the value of B, which equals k × (k − 1).
A-WSMSRC scheme uses an ANOT transform based on the Vandermonde matrix to preprocess the data, which is equivalent to encoding the data with Vandermonde-matrixbased RS codes. The Vandermonde-based RS codes scheme has a high complexity of multiplication and division in a finite field, which results in high computational overhead. In the OWSPM-MSR scheme, the Cauchy-matrix-based RS codes scheme is adopted. Note that multiplication and division can be transformed into addition and subtraction operations over finite fields, respectively, and can be realized by exclusive-OR(XOR) operations. Therefore, the OWSPM-MSR scheme has a lower computational complexity and requires less encoding time than the A-WSMSRC scheme.
Furthermore, we measured the computational overhead during reconstruction in terms of the decoding time. Figure 3 shows a comparison of the decoding times between the schemes during data reconstruction for different k and m. The OWSPM-MSR scheme required less time to decode than the A-WSMSRC scheme; however, it was nine times longer than the PM-MSR codes scheme in the worst case. The time gap between the schemes increased with the increase of k and m. The decoding time of each scheme was longer than the encoding time because the matrix inverse operation was required.
The reason for the difference in decoding performance of each scheme is the same as that of the encoding operation. In A-WSMSRC and OWSPM-MSR scheme, the data need to be decoded twice, so the decoding time is relatively long. In addition, the complexity of inversion of Vandermonde matrix is higher than that of Cauchy matrix, so OWSPM-MSR scheme requires less decoding time than A-WSMSRC scheme.
Moreover, while repairing the data of a single node, all three schemes had the same computational overhead. The data stored in the nodes under the schemes were different; however the amount of data to be repaired was the same, and the repair algorithms were consistent with the PM-MSR scheme. Thus, the computational overhead was the same.
As mentioned above, the OWSPM-MSR codes scheme achieved optimal weak security, but its computational overhead was higher than that of the PM-MSR codes scheme and lower than that of the A-WSMSRC scheme.
C. STORAGE OVERHEAD
The A-WSMSRC and OWSPM-MSR scheme added the precoding process without adding redundant data; i.e., the storage overhead of the two schemes did not increase, which was consistent with the PM-MSR scheme. The storage utilization rate remained k/n.
D. BLOCK SECURITY
According to Theorem 3, the OWSPM-MSR codes scheme has optimal weak security. Consider a Cauchy-based PM-MSR codes scheme and OWSPM-MSR codes scheme with parameters n = 7, k = 4, d = 6, α = 3, β = 1. Figure 4 shows a comparison of block security between these two schemes.
As shown in Figure 4 , block security decreases as l increases. In the case of 1 ≤ l ≤ 3, the Cauchy-based PM-MSR codes scheme does not have optimal weak security. When l = α = 3, the two schemes have the same block security. In the case of l = α + 1 = 4, Eva can obtain the data of any k nodes, which can decode the original data; thus, neither scheme has weak security.
The A-WSMSRC scheme uses the Vandermonde-matrixbased RS codes to precode data. However, the Vandermonde matrix does not have the property of invertibility of any submatrix; thus, its level of block security cannot be proved using the method of Theorem 3. The block security level of the A-WSMSRC scheme is between that of the OWSPM-MSR and PM-MSR scheme, and is related to the finite field size and Vandermonde matrix used.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we evaluate the weak security of a Cauchymatrix-based PM-MSR codes scheme under different parameters, demonstrating that (2α − l)-block security against an eavesdropper with parameter l(l < k) can be achieved. We show the optimal weak security of MSR codes, indicating that (B − lα)-block security can be achieved in the best case scenario. Based on this result, we propose an improved scheme based on the PM-MSR codes scheme that optimizes weak security. The OWSPM-MSR codes scheme uses the Cauchy-matrix-based RS codes to first pre-code the data, and then encode the data using the Cauchy-matrixbased PM-MSR codes. Because the generator matrix of these two coding schemes satisfies the condition specified in Section IV, the analysis demonstrates that the scheme achieves optimal weak security. SHOUSHAN LUO received the B.Sc. degree in mathematics from Beijing Normal University, in 1985, and the M.Sc. degree in applied mathematics and the Ph.D. degree in signal and information processing from the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT), Beijing, China, in 1994 and 2001, respectively, where he is currently a Professor with the School of Cyberspace Security. His current research interests include cryptography and information security.
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